‘We Have Our Own Revolvers’: How Security Forces and Criminal Gangs May Divide Russia’s Fuel Market

As Russia’s fuel crisis deepens amid ongoing economic pressures and infrastructure strain, analysts are warning that the country’s gasoline distribution network may be heading toward a transformation that echoes some of the darkest periods in post-Soviet history. The emerging ‘black market’ for fuel is expected to evolve rapidly from simple queue speculation to a fully criminalized system where organized groups control every aspect of logistics and distribution. This scenario raises serious concerns about the future of energy security for ordinary Russian citizens and businesses alike.

The current situation represents a perfect storm of factors that historically have created conditions for shadow economies to flourish. International sanctions have severely restricted Russia’s access to refinery equipment and spare parts, while the redirection of fuel exports to fund military operations has created domestic shortages in numerous regions. Reports from various Russian provinces indicate that gasoline stations are experiencing intermittent supply disruptions, with some rural areas seeing complete dry-outs lasting several days. These conditions mirror the chaotic period of the early 1990s, when the collapse of Soviet distribution systems led to widespread criminal involvement in essential goods markets.

Historical precedent suggests that when legitimate supply chains fail, criminal organizations quickly fill the vacuum. During the turbulent transition years following the Soviet collapse, organized crime groups established control over everything from aluminum production to vodka distribution. The fuel sector was particularly attractive due to its essential nature and high profit margins. Veterans of that era recall how ‘protection’ payments became standard operating procedure, with refineries, transport companies, and retail stations all falling under the influence of various criminal structures. Security analysts note that many of these networks never fully disappeared but rather went dormant or semi-legitimate during the relatively stable Putin years.

The phrase ‘we have our own revolvers’ – reportedly circulating among certain business circles – speaks to the anticipated competition between state security apparatus and criminal organizations for control of this lucrative market. Russia’s FSB and other security services have historically maintained their own economic interests, often operating in gray zones that blur the line between state function and private enterprise. Some experts suggest that rather than a clear confrontation, the more likely outcome is a negotiated division of territories and supply chains, similar to arrangements that characterized the 1990s commodities trade. Regional power brokers, local security chiefs, and established criminal authorities may reach informal agreements that ensure stable, if illegal, fuel distribution.

The mechanics of black market fuel distribution typically begin with diversion at the source. Refinery workers, transport drivers, and storage facility managers become key players in siphoning off official supplies. What starts as small-scale theft for personal use or local sale can quickly scale up when organized groups provide protection, logistics, and retail networks. In previous fuel crises in post-Soviet states, elaborate schemes emerged involving falsified documentation, bribed inspectors, and parallel distribution networks that operated alongside – and sometimes within – official channels. The digital age adds new dimensions, with cryptocurrency payments and encrypted communications enabling more sophisticated operations.

For ordinary Russian citizens, this evolution portends significantly higher prices and decreased reliability of supply. Black market premiums during acute shortages can reach 200-300% above official prices, effectively pricing out lower-income consumers and small businesses. Agricultural operations, which depend heavily on diesel fuel for planting and harvest seasons, face particular vulnerability. Some regional authorities have already begun implementing rationing systems and priority allocation schemes, but these measures often create additional opportunities for corruption and favoritism. The social contract between state and citizen, already strained by economic hardships, faces further erosion when basic necessities become available primarily through informal channels.

Looking ahead, the trajectory of Russia’s fuel market will likely depend on several key factors: the duration and intensity of international sanctions, the government’s ability to maintain refinery operations, and the political will to confront entrenched interests benefiting from scarcity. Some observers suggest that controlled shortages may actually serve certain regime interests by creating dependency and enabling selective distribution to loyal regions and populations. Whatever the underlying dynamics, the emerging reality points toward a fuel economy where access depends less on market mechanisms or official allocation than on connections, payments, and the implicit threat of force that has long characterized Russian shadow economics.